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"The donor transfers property worth $1,000,000 to a
child in exchange for the child's promise to pay the
donor $103,000 per year for the donor's life. The donor
is age 60 but has been diagnosed with an incurable
illness and has at least a 50 percent probability of
dying within 1 year. The section 7520 interest rate for
the month of the transfer is 10.6 percent, and the
standard annuity factor at that interest rate for a person
age 60 in normal health is 7.4230. Thus, if the donor
were not terminally ill, the present value of the annuity
would be $764,569 ($103,000 x 7.4230). Assuming the
presumption provided (in Treas. Reg. § 25.7520-
3(b)(2)) does not apply, because there is at least a 50
percent probability that the donor will die within 1
year, the standard section 7520 annuity factor may not
be used to determine the present value of the donor's
annuity interest. Instead, a special section 7520 annuity
factor must be computed that takes into account the
projection of the donor's actual life expectancy."23
In conclusion
The key provision in the new regulatory language is the
50 percent probability of death within on year.24 That is a
substantially different rule from the "death is imminent"
standard applicable previously.25
FOOTNOTES
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Harl, Agricultural Law Manual § 6.04 (1995).
2 Rev. Rul. 96-3, I.R.B. 1996-2.
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6 I.R.C. § 2013.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
AUTOMATIC STAY. The debtors had signed-up for
the 1988 farm programs for their rice and wheat crops. The
debtors had received an advance disaster payment for the
rice crop. Although the debtors eventually applied for full
disaster payments, the USDA denied all disaster payments
based on the failure of the debtors to follow normal cultural
practices in growing the rice. After the debtors filed for
Chapter 12, the USDA set off the advance disaster payment
for the rice crop against disaster payments owed to the
debtors for the wheat crop losses. The USDA did not
petition for relief from the automatic stay before the setoff.
The court ruled that the setoff violated the automatic stay
and the debtors sought an award of attorney's fees for
challenging the setoff. The court awarded about one-third of
the claimed fees at a rate of $90.00 per hour. The court
noted that the USDA was primarily responsible for the
protracted nature of the proceedings. In re Winchester, 191
B.R. 93 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1995).
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS . The debtor was a
producer of soybean seed and had contracted with a dealer
to produce soybean seed from foundation seed owned by the
dealer. The debtor also contracted with several growers to
grow the seed. The debtor was to receive a premium on each
bushel of seed delivered to the dealer and paid a premium to
the growers out of the premium received from the dealer.
The debtor lost its state grain license and its business was
operated under the state Department of Agriculture for the
purpose of winding up the debtor's affairs. Although most of
the contract had been performed by the time the debtor filed
for bankruptcy, several payments were made within 90 days
prior to the filing. The payments were made to the state
Department of Agriculture and were not part of the debtor's
bankruptcy estate. The trustee sought to recover those
payments as either fraudulent or preferential. The trustee
alleged that the seed contract with the dealer was void
because it was not written as required by Ill. Cod. Stat. ch.
505, § 105/1. The court held that the statute did not provide
that an unwritten contract was void but only provided
penalties for failing to put a seed contract in writing. The
trustee also argued that the payments were preferential. The
court held that the payments were made in the ordinary
course of business as part of the contract. In re Ostrom-
Martin, Inc., 191 B.R. 126 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1996).
ESTATE PROPERTY. The debtor owned a tax
deferred annuity contract which was tax qualified under
I.R.C. § 403(b). The annuity contained a spendthrift clause
which was effective under state law. The court held that the
annuity contract was not estate property under Section
541(c)(2). In re Johnson, 191 B.R. 75 (Bankr. M.D. Pa.
1996).
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EXEMPTIONS
HOMESTEAD. The debtors owned a residence on 2.8
acres of land just outside the limits of a city. The debtors
constructed several buildings on the property which were
used for a bus construction and renovation business. The
debtor claimed the entire parcel of land as an exempt rural
homestead. The court held that the debtors were limited to
an urban homestead exemption because a portion of the
property was used for business purposes, an equivalent to
abandonment of that portion of the homestead, and the
property was located sufficiently close to an urban center
that the essential character of the property was urban. In re
Evans, 190 B.R. 1015 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1995).
The debtors owned a residence on 9.7 acres of land
outside a city limits. The land was not used for any
agricultural purposes. The court characterized the area as
part of a megalopolitan area between two cities which was
continuously developed with residences and businesses.
Although the debtor's residence was over a mile from banks,
shops and gas stations, the city amenities were easily and
quickly reached by car on good roads. The court held that
the debtor was entitled to only an urban homestead
exemption for the property. In re Oldner, 191 B.R. 146
(Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1995).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
TRUSTEE'S FEES. The debtors' Chapter 12 plan
provided for some direct payments to creditors with
impaired claims and some payments through the trustee.
The trustee objected to the direct payments for impaired
claims, arguing that the loss of the fees from the direct
payments left insufficient compensation for the trustee's
duties. The court sympathized with the trustee but held that,
under In re Wagner, 36 F.3d 723 (8th Cir. 1994), a Chapter
12 debtor may make direct payments on impaired claims
without paying the trustee's fee. The court suggested that the
trustee obtain permission to hire an attorney to perform
some of the trustee's duties and charge the attorney's fees to
the estate. Query: will that work? In re Jennings, 190 B.R.
863 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
TAX YEAR. The debtors filed their Chapter 11 petition
on September 30, 1992 and did not make the I.R.C. §
1398(d)(2)(A) election to divide their 1992 tax year into two
years, with the first year ending on the date of the petition.
The IRS filed a claim for the 1992 taxes as an administrative
claim. The debtors argued that the 1992 taxes attributable to
the period from January 1, 1992 to September 30, 1992
were entitled only to the eighth priority as taxes which
accrued pre-petition. The court held that because the debtors
failed to make the I.R.C. § 1398 election, the taxes became
due after the filing of the petition and were not allowed as
an administrative claim. In re Johnson, 190 B.R. 724
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1995).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
DAIRY TERMINATION PROGRAM. The plaintiffs
were dairy farmers who had signed up for the Dairy
Termination Program. After an investigation, it was
determined that the plaintiffs had not complied with the
program requirements in that the plaintiffs sold some of the
cows for purposes other than slaughter and failed to fully
account for the sale for slaughter of all cows. The USDA
ruled that these activities demonstrated that the plaintiffs
participated in a scheme or device designed to defeat the
purpose of the program. The USDA then refused to make
any program payments to the plaintiff and assessed a fine of
$871,000. The plaintiffs filed administrative appeals to the
National Appeals Division (NAD) which affirmed the
USDA decision, except that the penalty was reduced to
$26,000. The court held that its review of the NAD decision
was limited to whether the decision was arbitrary and
capricious and did not allow any review of the NAD's
findings of fact.  The court found that the NAD decision as
to the "scheme or device" ruling was based on its finding
that the plaintiffs had failed to prove otherwise. The NAD
decision focused on the DTP requirement that applicants
had the burden of demonstrating compliance. The court held
that this ruling was improper, because the burden should
have been on the USDA to prove by clear and convincing
evidence the existence of the scheme or device. However,
the NAD decision was upheld on the basis of the waiver
issue. The plaintiffs argued that the plaintiffs had
substantially and in good faith complied with the program
requirements such that the USDA should have waived the
small infractions. The NAD decision denying the waiver
also was based on the plaintiffs' failure to demonstrate full
compliance with the program requirements. The court held
that this part of the NAD ruling was proper in placing the
burden on the plaintiffs to show compliance and eligibility
for the waiver. The court upheld the penalty as consistent
with the findings that the plaintiffs did not fully comply
with the program requirements and did not make a food
faith effort to comply. Vandervelde v. Espy, 908 F. Supp.
11 (D. D.C. 1995).
NATIONAL FORESTS. The plaintiffs were owners of
ranches neighboring National Forest Service (NFS) land.
The plaintiffs claimed vested rights to water which flowed
over NFS land. The plaintiffs wanted to clear the ditches on
the NFS land and otherwise develop the water rights for use
on their ranches. The court assumed, for purposes of its
ruling, that the plaintiffs did have vested water rights and
the right to enter NFS land to clear the ditches. The
plaintiffs sought an injunction against the NFS to prohibit
any prosecution of the plaintiffs for their cleaning efforts.
The court held that, although the plaintiffs had a vested right
to the water and a right of way for the ditches, the plaintiffs
were still subject to valid NFS regulations concerning
actions on NFS land. Thus, the plaintiffs were required to
obtain permits for entry on to the land and, if the permits
were denied, were required to make administrative appeals.
The court held that, because the plaintiffs had not applied
for such permits or filed any administrative appeals, they
were susceptible to prosecution if they entered the NFS land
to clean the ditches. Therefore, the court denied an
injunction against NFS prosecution of the plaintiffs. Elko
County Bd. of Supervisors v. Glickman, 909 F. Supp.
759 (D. Nev. 1995).
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FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES. A portion of the
decedent's estate passed under a revocable trust to the
decedent's heirs. The trust was to be funded with an amount
equal to the decedent's GSTT exemption amount. State law
required the estate to pay to a trust 5 percent interest during
the time between the decedent's death and the funding of the
trust. The estate sought to claim the interest paid to the trust
as an administrative expense. The IRS ruled that the state
interest requirement was a method of insuring that trust
beneficiaries would receive a share of the income from the
trust assets from the date of the decedent's death; therefore,
the "interest" was more similar to trust income than to
regular interest on money owed. The IRS ruled that the
interest paid to the trust by the estate was not claimable as
an administrative expense. Ltr. Rul. 9604002, Oct. 6, 1995.
ANNUITY. Within two months before death, the
decedent transferred property to an annuity under a private
annuity agreement with the decedent's heirs. The value of
the annuity was calculated using a life expectancy of 15
years. Although the decedent's doctor had sent a letter
stating that the decedent had a good chance for recovery
from cancer, the decedent had been ill from the disease for
some time. The Tax Court had found that the decedent's life
expectancy was at least one year but denied the use of the
life-expectancy tables in Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5 because
the decedent's death was imminent. The appellate court
remanded the case back to the Tax Court for clarification as
to the decedent's life expectancy at the time the annuity was
purchased. The court noted that Rev. Rul. 80-80, 1980-1
C.B. 194 provides that death was not considered imminent if
the decedent was expected to live for a year or more. See the
lead article in this issue. McLendon Estate v. Comm'r, 96-
1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,220 (5th Cir. 1996).
GROSS ESTATE. The taxpayer was the surviving
spouse of the decedent. The taxpayer petitioned for and
obtained a state probate court order reforming the decedent's
will to provide for funding of a trust for the surviving
spouse. The IRS ruled that the state court order did not
apply retroactively for purposes of determining whether
trust assets would be included in the taxpayer's gross estate.
Ltr. Rul. 9609018, Nov. 27, 1995.
IRA. The decedent had commenced withdrawals from
an IRA after age 70 1/2 and used the permissive
recalculation rule for determining annual required
distributions. The decedent's estate was the named
beneficiary of the IRA and the decedent's daughter was the
sole beneficiary of the decedent's estate. The IRS ruled that
because no individual was a named beneficiary of the IRA,
the recalculation rule continued to be used for post-death
distributions, using a life expectancy of zero. Therefore, the
entire IRA was required to be distributed to the estate. Ltr.
Rul. 9604027, Nov. 1, 1995.
The decedent had owned funds in an IRA. The ruling
does not disclose who the remainder beneficiary was of the
IRA. The decedent's surviving spouse was the executrix of
the estate and caused the IRA funds to be distributed to the
executrix and then distributed to the executrix as an
individual. The funds were then placed in an IRA in the
surviving spouse's name. The IRS ruled that the IRA funds
were not included in the surviving spouse's gross income.
Ltr. Rul. 9609052, Dec. 7, 1995.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
decedent's will bequeathed property to the surviving spouse
in trust. The will provided that the executor had the
authority to determine how much of the decedent's residuary
estate would be used to fund the trust. The IRS argued that
the trust property was not QTIP because (1) the property did
not vest in the surviving spouse as of the date of the
decedent’s death and (2) the property did not pass from the
decedent to the surviving spouse but passed only by the
actions of the executrix. The Tax Court acknowledged that
its decisions in several cases in support of the IRS have been
reversed on appeal and decided to follow the appellate
cases, holding that the property passing to the marital trust
for which the QTIP election was made was eligible for the
marital deduction. See Estate of Robertson v. Comm’r, 98
T.C. 678 (1992), rev'd, 15 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 1994); Estate
of Clayton v. Comm’r, 97 T.C. 327 (1991), rev'd, 976 F.2d
1486 (5th Cir. 1992); Est. of Spencer v. Comm'r, T.C.
Memo. 1992-579, rev'd, 43 F.3d 226 (6th Cir. 1995). Note:
The Digest will publish in the near future an article by Neil
E. Harl on this issue. Estate of Clack v. Comm'r, 106 T.C.
No. 6 (1996).
The decedent's estate included a remainder interest in
property in which the decedent's parent held a life estate.
The decedent's remainder interest passed to the decedent's
surviving spouse and the executor elected QTIP treatment
for the remainder interest and claimed the property as a
marital deduction. The estate argued that the property was
income producing because the age differences between the
parent and surviving spouse made it likely that the spouse
would receive the property. The IRS ruled that the
remainder interests were not eligible for QTIP because the
surviving spouse would not be entitled to all the income
from the property. Ltr. Rul. 9604003, Oct. 10, 1995.
The decedent's will provided for a bequest to the
surviving spouse based on a formula to decrease the
decedent's estate tax to zero after providing for bequests
eligible for the unified credit. The will gave the executor the
sole power and discretion to determine what assets would be
used to fund the marital bequest. The surviving spouse
executed a written disclaimer of specific assets in the estate.
The IRS argued that the disclaimer decreased the marital
deduction because the executor had the sole power to
determine what assets passed to the surviving spouse. The
court agreed and held that the marital deduction was to be
reduced by the value of the property disclaimed by the
surviving spouse. Nix v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1996-109.
The decedent had been married twice. When the first
marriage was terminated, the decedent and spouse entered
into a settlement agreement under which the children of that
marriage were to receive one-half of the decedent's estate.
The decedent remarried and provided in a will for two
marital trusts which would qualify for the marital deduction.
The decedent's first spouse and children challenged the will,
asserting the divorce settlement agreement. The surviving
spouse and the previous spouse and children entered into a
settlement which provided for some property to be
distributed to the children of the first marriage. The
decedent's estate claimed a marital deduction for the
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property which was distributed to the surviving spouse
under the agreement. The IRS ruled that the property
passing to the surviving spouse under the agreement was
eligible for the marital deduction because the settlement was
reached in good faith in settlement of enforceable rights.
Ltr. Rul. 9610018, Dec. 7, 1995.
The decedent died testate and the will provided for a
marital trust and a family trust for the surviving spouse. The
difference between the trusts was that the distributions to the
spouse in the family trust were discretionary and the marital
trust distributions were mandatory. The surviving spouse
and the children petitioned the state probate court to not
have the will probated, resulting in all of the estate passing
to the surviving spouse outright. The IRS ruled that the
property was not eligible for the marital deduction because
the spouse did not obtain the property in settlement of
enforceable rights in the property. In addition, the IRS ruled
that the probate court petition was not a qualified disclaimer
and could not be deemed a qualified disclaimer because
some remainder holders under the original will did not join
in the petition. Ltr. Rul. 9610004, Nov. 8, 1995.
SPECIAL USE VALUATION-ALM § 5.03[2].* The
taxpayer was bequeathed farm land which had been valued
for estate tax purposes under a the special use valuation
election. The taxpayer exchanged a portion of the land for
another tract of farmland which the taxpayer would use in
the taxpayer's farming operation. No additional property or
cash was involved in the exchange. The IRS ruled that the
exchange qualified for like-kind exchange treatment for
income tax purposes and would not cause recapture of
special use valuation benefits by the taxpayer. Ltr. Rul.
9604018, Oct. 30, 1995.
TAX LIEN. The decedent was the president of a
corporation which owned 56 acres of land. The corporation
transferred the land to two trusts. Each trust was established
by the decedent for a granddaughter who also served as
trustee with two other related persons. The trusts gave a
promissory note in exchange for the land but did not make
any payments on the notes. The trusts gave the corporation a
mortgage to secure the notes. The IRS filed a tax lien
against the property for estate taxes and the corporation
claimed a security interest in the land with priority over the
tax lien. The court held that the transfer of the land to the
trusts was a gift because the transfer was made for estate tax
planning purposes and the corporation, which was
controlled by the decedent, never intended to enforce the
promissory notes. Therefore, the mortgage given for the
promissory notes was without adequate consideration and
unenforceable against the tax lien. Waldrep v. Comm'r,
96-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,105 (D. S.D. Fla. 1996).
TRUSTS. The taxpayer owned a residential property of
400 square feet with 3500 square feet used as the taxpayer's
personal residence. The other 500 square feet were rented as
an unfurnished apartment. The taxpayer transferred the
property to a trust which satisfied the requirements of Treas.
Reg. § 25.2702-5(c) for qualified personal residence trust.
The IRS ruled that the entire property was a personal
residence for purposes of the QPRT regulations. Ltr. Rul.
9609015, Nov. 22, 1995.
VALUATION . The decedent's estate included 100
percent of the stock of a corporation which owned and
operated a tv station. The IRS and executor reached a
stipulated agreement on the value of the stock based on
appraisals and the executor sought a 25 percent discount for
lack of marketability. The stock was not tradable on an
exchange and the stipulated value was not based on the
stock's "freely-traded" value. The court rejected the
executor's 25 percent marketability discount because the
decedent owned all of the stock and a marketability discount
did not apply where the value was not based on the stock's
freely-trade value. Although the opinion is not explicit on
this point, it appears that the stipulated value may have
already included a discount for the stock's non-trade status.
Cloutier Estate v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1996-49.
In 1988, the taxpayer transferred shares of stock to the
taxpayer's children. The taxpayers filed a gift tax return and
claimed a value of $385 per share for the stock for gift tax
purposes based on an appraisal by a professional appraiser.
The IRS sought an explanation of the valuation method in
1990 and the taxpayers obtained a second appraisal which
gave the stock a $167.98 per share value. The taxpayers
filed an amended return based on the second value which
eliminated any gift tax due. The IRS appraised the stock at
$445 per share. The taxpayers also presented evidence of a
stock redemption five years before the gift transfer which
redeemed the stock held by other family members at $98 per
share. The court reviewed all of the appraisal methods at
held that the stock had a fair market value of $296 per share.
Rabenhorst v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1996-92.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BAD DEBT. The taxpayer loaned $10,000 to a friend in
July 1988 to help the friend in business. The taxpayer
intended to be repaid in 90 days but was not. The friend did
not give a promissory note or other written repayment
agreement for the money. The taxpayer continued to press
for the repayment of the money but gave up in January 1989
when the friend's phone was disconnected. The court held
that the debt became worthless in 1989. Schenk v.
Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1996-113.
DEPRECIATION. The taxpayer was a corporation
which operated a nursery. The corporation owned some land
and leased a contiguous parcel from its sole shareholder.
The shareholder also was the president of the corporation.
The president moved into a house on the corporation's land
when the president assumed the duties of the foreman who
had previously lived in the house. The president also owned
a residence in the nearby city where the president's family
lived during the week. The corporation paid for
improvements to the residence, including a swimming pool
and pool house. The corporation claimed depreciation
deductions for the improvements. The court held that,
because the president's duties as foreman required residence
on the corporation's property, the improvements were
allowable as business expenses.  Maschmeyer's Nursery,
Inc. v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1996-789.
DISASTER AREAS-ALM § 4.05[2].*  The IRS has
announced the disaster areas designated by the President for
1995 for purposes of eligibility of taxpayers to qualify for
I.R.C. § 165(i) deferral of claiming losses from those
disasters. Rev. Rul. 96-13, I.R.B. 1996-_, _.
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DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS . The taxpayer
was the sole shareholder of a corporation which operated an
insurance agency. The taxpayer had personally guaranteed
amounts owed by the corporation to an insurance company.
The corporation was dissolved after a dispute with the
insurance company. The insurance company sued on the
debt and eventually reached a settlement with the taxpayer
for much less than the amount owed by the corporation. The
court held that the taxpayer did not recognize discharge of
indebtedness income from the settlement because the
taxpayer did not receive any of the original loan amounts
and was only relieved of an obligation to pay the debt.
Whitmer v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1996-83.
EMPLOYMENT TAXES . The IRS has issued
procedures for a one year test program allowing early
referral of employment tax issues to the Appeals Division
while a taxpayer is audited at the District level. Ann. 96-13,
I.R.B. 1996-12.
ENTERTAINMENT EXPENSES. The taxpayer
corporation operated an oil and gas pipeline inspection
company. The taxpayer sublet a ranch for use as a hunting
area. The ranch included a cabin and the taxpayer built
hunting blinds on the property. The taxpayer notified the
ranch tenant when any hunting was to occur. The taxpayer
claimed the rent as a business expense. The court stated that
I.R.C. § 274(a)(1)(B) prohibited deductions with respect to a
facility used for entertainment, amusement or recreation.
The taxpayer argued that the sublease of the ranch was not a
facility. The court held that the sublease of the ranch
allowed the taxpayer exclusive rights to use the ranch for
hunting; therefore, the sublet ranch was a facility and any
expenses attributed to the use of the ranch were not allowed
as a business deduction by the taxpayer.  On Shore Quality
Control Specialists, Inc. v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1996-
95.
GROSS INCOME. The taxpayer had entered into an
installment contract to purchase real property from a third
party. The taxpayer had to file three law suits to enforce the
contract and eventually settled for a specific sum of
damages. The third party paid most of the settlement
amount to the taxpayer's children under an assignment
executed by the taxpayer. The third party then submitted
less than the remainder to the taxpayer but the taxpayer
refused the partial payment in order to preserve the
taxpayer's right to the entire settlement amount. The
taxpayer did not include the payment to the children nor the
partial payment in income. The taxpayer argued that the
partial payment was not taxable because the amount was
still subject to litigation. The court held that both amounts
were includible in the taxpayer's gross income, the first as
an assignment of income and the second because the
taxpayer had an absolute right to the payment and had no
obligation to repay the amount. Moorefield v. Comm'r,
T.C. Memo. 1996-98.
HOME OFFICE. The taxpayer was a piano teacher
who claimed expenses associated with the taxpayer's
residence which were attributable to the giving of piano
lessons in the taxpayer's home. The expenses were allocated
based on the percentage of square feet in an area of the
taxpayer's living room where a grand piano stood and was
used for the lessons. The court held that the deductions were
allowable, holding that the space used exclusively for a
business need not be physically separated from the living
areas of the home. Hewett v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1996-
110.
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS. The IRS has
issued a training manual, "Employee or Independent
Contractor?" containing guidance as to who is an employee
and who is an independent contractor for federal tax
purposes. Worker Classification Training Guide, 96 ARD
045-1.
INTEREST RATE.  The IRS has announced that for
the period April 1, 1996 through June 30, 1996, the interest
rate paid on tax overpayments is 7 percent and for
underpayments is 8 percent. The interest rate for
underpayments by large corporations is 10 percent. The
interest rate on corporate overpayments above $10,000 is
5.5 percent. Rev. Rul. 96-17, I.R.B 1996-__.
LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES. The taxpayer and five
other related persons owned one-sixth interests in 23 parcels
of farm property. The taxpayer exchanged the one-sixth
interests in 20 of the properties for full fee interests in three
of the properties. The value of the exchanged properties was
of approximate equal value. The IRS ruled that the
exchange was eligible for like-kind tax free treatment. Ltr.
Rul. 9609016, Nov. 22, 1995.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS. The taxpayers
were partners in a partnership which had claimed
investment tax credit in one tax year and investment tax
recapture in a subsequent year. After the IRS began an audit
of the partnership, the taxpayers filed amended returns
which did not include the investment tax credit for the first
year and reduced recapture tax for the second year. The
taxpayers then filed for bankruptcy. The IRS audit
eventually did allow some of the investment tax credit but
charged the partnership with additional recapture tax for the
second year. The taxpayers argued that they were not liable
for the additional recapture tax because they did not claim
the investment tax credit in the first tax year. In addition, the
taxpayers argued that the filing of the bankruptcy case
removed their partnership items from consideration in the
audit. The court held that the bankruptcy filing only
removed the taxpayers as persons from the audit in order for
the audit not to violate the automatic stay and that the
investment tax credit remained a partnership item subject to
the audit determination; therefore, the taxpayers remained
liable for their share of the recapture tax. Phillips v.
Comm'r, 106 T.C. No. 7 (1996).
The case involved two partnerships, each with two
partners. The IRS had issued deficiency notices involving
the taxpayers' partnership income or loss from their
partnerships and did not issue a Notice of Final Partnership
Administrative Adjustments (FPAA). The first partnership
consisted of two partners, each with equal limited and
general partnership interests. The first partnership had only
net loss for the tax year and each partner received an equal
portion of the loss. The partners argued that the partnership
did not qualify as a small partnership because items such as
guaranteed payments were not equal between the partners.
One requirement for small partnership status is that the
partners receive the same share of all partnership items. In
both cases, the partnerships allocated to each partner a share
of the net partnership income or loss. The court held that the
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partnership did qualify as a small partnership excepted from
the FPAA requirements because items such as guaranteed
payments are not considered for purposes of the same share
requirement for small partnership status. The second
partnership was similar to the first partnership, with the two
partners receiving a share of the net income or loss from the
partnership. The partners' capital accounts, however, were
charged differently. The court held that the second
partnership qualified as a small partnership because the
method of charging the capital accounts did not affect the
same share rule for small partnership status. Schwartz v.
Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1996-88.
The taxpayers were partners in a partnership (first tier
partnership) which was a partner in several other
partnerships (second tier partnerships). The IRS conducted
audits of the second tier partnerships but did not directly
inform the taxpayers about the audit or the settlements
reached with the second tier partnerships. The taxpayers
were not identified on the second tier partnerships' income
tax returns nor did the tax matters partners of those
partnerships send the IRS the names and addresses of the
taxpayers. The court held that the IRS was not required to
notify the taxpayers about the audit. Walthall v. Comm'r,
96-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CH) ¶ 50,101 (D. Alaska 1995).
CONSTRUCTIVE DISTRIBUTIONS. The taxpayers
were limited partners in a partnership formed to construct
and operate an office building. The limited partners
purchased their interests in the partnership with cash and
promissory notes. The partnership purchased a financial
security bond that would pay for any promissory note
default by a limited partner. The taxpayers entered into an
agreement with the bond holder for payment on the bond in
settlement of their promissory notes. The court held that the
taxpayers recognized income from the cancellation of the
indebtedness. The court stated that, although the settlements
were between the taxpayers and the bond holder, the result
was a change in a partnership item and subject to the
partnership income tax rules. Dakota Hills Offices Limited
Partnership v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1996-35.
DISTRIBUTIVE SHARE. The taxpayers were partners
in a partnership in the business of providing accounting
services including the preparation of tax returns. The IRS
assessed deficiencies based on a reconstruction of
partnership income and a redetermination of the distributive
share of each taxpayer. The taxpayers failed to keep
adequate records to account for the amount of time each
spent on partnership business. The court found that the
taxpayers' testimony about their business was contradictory
and unreliable and that the taxpayers had failed to cooperate
with the IRS in the audit. The court held that the IRS
reconstruction of partnership and the taxpayers' income was
sufficient to support the assessment of deficiencies and also
upheld the assessment of a penalty for intent to evade
payment of taxes. The court noted that the taxpayers were
tax professionals well aware of the recordkeeping
requirements. McDonald v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1996-
87.
PENSION PLANS. The taxpayer and decedent were the
sole shareholders of a corporation which owned a defined
benefit pension plan. The decedent had received a
distribution from the plan and did not include the payment
in income. The decedent suffered from a diseased foot at the
time of the distribution. The plan provided for payment
from the plan for disabilities which prevented the recipient
from working for more than 12 months. The court held that
the plan was not an accident or health insurance plan
because the plan provided no payments for injuries or
sickness other than the 12 month disability; therefore, the
payment to the decedent was included in gross income.
Estate of Hall v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1996-93.
RENT DEDUCTION. The taxpayer was a corporation
which operated a nursery. The corporation owned some land
and leased a contiguous parcel from its sole shareholder.
The taxpayer based the rent upon several factors, including
the potential of the land for residential development. The
court disallowed a portion of the rent deduction because the
taxpayer failed to demonstrate that the rent was based on the
fair market rent of the property. Maschmeyer's Nursery,
Inc. v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1996-789.
TAX PROTESTORS. The taxpayer was assessed tax
deficiencies for failure to report items of income. Although
the taxpayer brought an action to challenge the assessments,
the court found that the taxpayer presented only
"nonsensical 'legal' tax protester arguments" in response to
the court's questions about issues of fact. The court held that
the taxpayer's action was little more than a delaying tactic
and an attempt to espouse tax protester arguments;
therefore, the court held for the IRS and assessed an
additional penalty of $5,000 for the bringing of a frivolous
suit. Wesselman v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1996-85.
The taxpayer was assessed a tax deficiency, interest and
penalties for failing to report wage income from the
taxpayer's employment as an airline pilot. The taxpayer
presented only "tax protester" arguments which the court
summarily rejected. The court allowed the deficiency,
interest and penalties and added a $10,000 penalty for
bringing a frivolous suit. Fox v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo.
1996-79.
STATE REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURE
APPLES . The plaintiff was an apple grower who
challenged assessments made by the California Apple
Commission. The plaintiff argued that the assessments on
apples for the purpose of promoting the sale of California
apples violated the plaintiff's First Amendment free speech
and freedom of association rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection rights. The defendant
Commission argued that the federal courts did not have
jurisdiction under the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341,
because the controversy involved a tax and the plaintiff had
a remedy in the state courts. The court held that the
assessment was not a tax because the assessment proceeds
were not placed in the state general fund and were used to
benefit a specific portion of the state population. Bidart
Bros. v. The California Apple Comm'n, 73 F.3d 925 (9th
Cir. 1996).
CITATION UPDATES
Brabson v. U.S., 73 F.3d 1040 (10th Cir. 1996), rev'g,
94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,446 (D. Colo. 1994) (court
awards and settlements) see p. 21 supra.
AGRICULTURAL LAW PRESS
P.O. BOX 50703
EUGENE, OR 97405
48
  
SEMINAR IN PARADISE
  
FARM ESTATE AND BUSINESS PLANNING by Dr. Neil E. Harl
January 6-10, 1997
Spend a week in Hawai'i in January 1997! Balmy trade
winds, 70-80 degrees, palm trees, white sand beaches and
the rest of paradise can be yours; plus a world-class seminar
on Farm Estate and Business Planning by Dr. Neil E. Harl.
The seminar is scheduled for January 6-10, 1997 at the
beautiful ocean-front Royal Waikoloan Resort on the Big
Island, Hawai'i.
Seminar sessions run from 8:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. each
day, Monday through Friday, with a continental breakfast
and break refreshments included in the registration fee.
Each participant will receive a copy of Dr. Harl's 400 page
seminar manual, Farm Estate and Business Planning:
Annotated Materials which will be updated just prior to the
seminar.
     Here are the major topics to be covered:
   • Introduction to estate and business planning.
   • Liquidity planning with emphasis on 15-year installment
payment of federal estate tax.
   • Co-ownership of property, including discounts, taxation
and special problems.
   • Federal estate tax, including alternate valuation date,
special use valuation, handling life insurance, marital
deduction planning, disclaimers, planning to minimize tax
over deaths of both spouses, and generation skipping
transfer tax.
   • Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future
interests, handling estate freezes, and "hidden" gifts.
   • Income tax aspects of property transfer, including
income in respect of decedent, installment sales, private
annuities, self-cancelling installment notes, and part
gift/part sale transactions.
   • Using trusts, including funding of revocable living
trusts.
   • Organizing the farm business--one entity or two,
corporations, general and limited partnerships and limited
liability companies.
The Agricultural Law Press has made arrangements for
discount air fares on United Airlines and discounts on hotel
rooms at the Royal Waikoloan, the site of the seminar.
The seminar registration fee is $645 for current
subscribers to the Agricultural Law Digest or the
Agricultural Law Manual. The registration fee for
nonsubscribers is $695.
Watch your mail for more details in the next few weeks
or call Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958.
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